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In this paper, I investigate the behavior ofbankholding
company stock returns from 1979 to 1990 in order to
determine if bank risk has increased in recent years.
Simple statistics on total volatility ofreturns indicate that
the variance ofbankstockreturns rose in the latterpartof
the 1980s relative to earlierperiodsandto other stockand
bond investments. In the context of equilibrium asset
pricing models, I find that bank stock return covariance
with respect to overall stock market returns increased
during the 1980s while the sensitivity of bank stocks to
returns on long-term debtsecuritiesdeclined. Ialsodivide
the sample by banksizeandfindthatstocksoflarger banks
exhibitedmore stockmarketrisk than smallerbanks in the
latter part of the 1980s, while no banks exhibited any
statistically significant interest rate risk in the late 1980s.
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There is currently a widespreadperceptionthat the U.S.
banking system has become riskier in the past several
years. The large number ofbank failures, negative media
coverage of the industry, and the rhetoric of legislative
efforts in Washington to restructure the banking system all
have contributed to this perception. Moreover, the legacy
ofthe savings and loan crisis serves as a constantreminder
ofthe excessive risks that some U.S. financial institutions
undertook in the 1980s.
Industry observers have identified a number of factors
that are potential causes ofthis apparent increase in bank
risk. The usual list of suspects includes deregulation of
financial markets, increased competition in banking, and
financial innovation. The cause of any increased risk in
bankingprobably will be asubjectofdebatefor some time.
Nevertheless, it is instructive to investigate the recent
behavior ofbank risk to determine ifthe public perception
ofgreater risk is justified and whether any changes in risk
have occurred in a systematic way. In this paper, I conduct
such an investigation.
As a measure of bank risk, I consider the volatility of
bank stock returns. Ideally, a direct measure ofbank asset
Iisk might be preferred, but it is difficult to observe the
risks associated with specific bank assets. The behaviorof
bank stocks provides a reasonable, and readily available,
alternative. In the absence of regulation or deposit insur-
ance, there is a direct relationship between asset risk and
stockrisk. This relationship is complicatedbythe presence
of financial regulation and the deposit insurance system,
but the risk associated with holding bank stocks is still
informative about the risks to the banking system. More-
over, the current focus on increased capital requirements
for banks makes understanding bank stock risk particu-
larly relevant. Common stock comprises the largest por-
tion of bank capital and thus the value of bank equity
provides a good proxy for bank net worth.
Inthis paper, Iuse a time series, cross-section sampleof
large U.S. commercial bank holding companies to exam-
ine the behaviorofbankstock returns overthe period 1979
to 1990. I consider first the overall volatility of these
returns. Then, drawing on theories ofcapital assetpIicing,
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on the behavior ofU.S. banks' stock returns.
The results from this analysis indicate that the relation-
ship of bank stocks to systematic sources of risk in the
economy has changed significantly during the past several
years. Certainly, some sources of bank equity risk in-
creasedduring the 1980s. However, my analysis shows that
other sources of stock return variability actually declined
during this period. My results also indicate that there is
considerable variation among the banks in the sample
regarding their equity risk. For example, I separate the
banks in the sample by asset size. I find that the sensitivity
ofstock returns oflarge banks to overall stock market risk
has increased relative to that of smaller banks. An under-
standing of such cross-sectional variations may help to
identify potential winners and losers arising from pro-
posals to reform the banking system.
While the study of bank stock returns provides useful
insights into changes in bank risk, it is important to
recognize the limitations of these data. The variability of
bank stock returns reflects the market's perception of the
risks associated with all aspects ofbank holding company
activities. These include asset risks, default risks, charter
value risks, the risks associated with the value of the
deposit insurance guarantee, and so on. Itis not possible to
infer from these data what has happened to a particular
aspect of bank risk, say for example, to the riskiness of
bank assets. (For a study of bank asset risk, see Mark
Levonian's paper in this issue of the Review). The results
here identify how the systematic risk factors included in
asset pricing models influence the market's perception of
this amalgam ofbank stock risks and how this perception
is reflected in bank equity returns.
I. Related Literature
According to the capital asset pricing model (CAPM,
Sharpe 1964 and Lintner 1965), the return on a firm's
equity can be explained as a function of a single factor,
namely, the return on the market portfolio of assets. In
empirical applications of the CAPM, the proxy for this
market return typically is taken to be a broad measure of
stock market returns (such as the S&P 500, or the AMEX
composite index). The CAPM splits asset risk into two
components. The first, called market or systematic risk,
represents that portion of asset risk that is related to the
riskinessofthe marketportfolio. The secondcomponentis
calledresidual, ornonsystematic, risk and is the portion of
total asset risk that is unrelated to the market portfolio.
Because an investor can eliminate the effects of non-
systematic risk by suitably diversifying his portfolio, the
CAPM argues that the expected returns on individual
assets reflect only their systematic risk.
Bank stocks have been a frequent object of analysis in
studies of equity risk and returns. Banks are ofparticular
interest to economists because of their role as financial
intermediaries. This role is believed to make bank stocks
especially sensitive to changes ininterestrates. To testthis
hypothesis, a number of studies have extended the basic
CAPMformulation to include ameasure ofreturns ondebt
in addition to the return on the market portfolio of stocks.
This "two-index model" was first proposed by Stone
(1974), and variations ofthismodel have been investigated
in subsequent work by Martin and Keown (1977), Lloyd
and Schick (1977), Lynge and Zumwalt (1980), Chance
and Lane (1980), Flannery and James (1982, 1984a,
1984b), Beebe (1983), and Booth and Officer (1985). With
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the exception of the paper by Chance and Lane, these
studies have found that bank stock returns exhibit sen-
sitivity to interest rates over and above their sensitivity to
stock market changes. Moreover, this sensitivity exceeds
that shown by most nonfinancial firms, confirming the
notion that the particular nature of bank assets and lia-
bilities makes them especially sensitive to changes in
interest rates. 1
A number ofstudies have attempted to relate the market
and interestrate sensitivities ofbankstockreturns to some
aspectofbank balance sheetcomposition. Dietrich (1986),
for example, argues that the estimated coefficients in the
two-index model should depend on the balance sheet
proportions of broad categories of bank assets and lia-
bilities. He embeds this hypothesis into the two-index
model and estimates portfolio composition effects on the
risk factors. Dietrich finds that market risk, the estimated
coefficient on the market portfolio of stocks, is most
heavily influenced by lending activity, time deposits, and
long-term debt relative to assets. Interest rate risk, he
finds, is most affected by the proportionoftime deposits in
the balance sheet. While Dietrich's results suggest that
balance sheet composition may be important in explaining
the riskcharacteristicsofbankstocks, his empirical results
suffer from serious econometric problems. The asset and
liability categories used in that study also are too broad to
be ofmuch practical use in identifying specific sources of
bank risk.
In a similar avenue of research, Rosenberg and Perry
(1981) consider the determinants ofbank risk in a single-
index CAPM. More specifically, they estimate the effects
19on systematic and residual risk ofa large number ofasset
and liability ratios, operating characteristics, stock market
variables, and regional indicators. These authors find that
a number of their chosen indicators are significant de-
terminants of bank risk. More interesting, they find that
different indicators help to explain systematic and non-
systematic risk of bank stock returns. For example, size,
dividend yield, equity capital, and the asset/long-term
liability ratio all help to predict market-related risk. For
residual risk, earningsvariability andleverage are the most
importantdeterminants. Rosenberg and Perry suggest that
bank risk can be predicted by focusing on a few significant
indicators, and that efforts to understand bank risk should
focus on understanding these aspects of bank behavior.
One weakness of the studies cited above is that they
provide little theoretical justification for the particular
empirical specifications used. A study by Flannery and
James (l984a) relies on a firmer theoretical foundation for
the analysis of bank risk and return. In this work, the
authors test the so-called "nominal contracting hypothe-
sis" (French, Ruback, and Schwert 1983) on a sample of
bank and thrift stocks. This hypothesis suggests that a
firm's holdings of nominal assets and liabilities affect its
common stock returns through the redistributive effects of
unanticipated inflation and unanticipated changes in ex-
pected inflation. More specifically, the nominal contract-
ing hypothesis suggests that the interest rate sensitivity
of a firm's stock will be larger the greater the amount of
net nominal assets (that is, nominal assets minus nomi-
nal liabilities) and the longer the duration of those net
nominal assets.
Flannery and James first estimate a two-index model of
stockreturns on atime series, cross-section sample ofbank
stocks. They then develop a proxy for the duration of a
bank's net nominal assets and regress the estimated inter-
est rate coefficients on this duration measure. Nominal
asset duration is highly significantinexplaining the size of
the interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns. Kwan
(1991) extends this work by estimating the Flannery and
James model simultaneously in a random coefficients
framework. These studies confirm that the composition of
a bank's balance sheet, here as measuredby the duration of
its net nominal assets, can influence the sensitivity ofbank
stock returns to changes in interest rates.
II. Current Modeling Approach
thatstockto systematic, ornondiversifiable, risk.3 Accord-
ing to the CAPM, an "average" stock in the market port-
folio will have a value of I3Mj equal to one. An asset with
13Mjgreaterthan onecarriesabove average nondiversifiable
risk, and must provide a greater than average expected
return in order to induce investors to hold it. The CAPM
predicts that only nondiversifiable risk is rewarded by a
higher expected return. Risk that is idiosyncratic to the
individual stock, and can therefore be diversified away, is
not associated in equilibriumwith higherexpectedreturns.
The model thus predicts that the expected value of cxj is
zero. Ofcourse, realized or ex post values of cxj can differ
from zero ifnew information affects the asset's price and
return during the estimation period.
As mentioned in the previous section, the primary
hypothesis underlying the CAPM is that the return on the
market portfolio is a sufficient statistic to determine the
return on individual assets. One implication ofthis model,
therefore, is that no other variables should be significant in
explaining asset returns. Empirically, this prediction often
has not been supported, leading to asset pricing models in
which additional or alternative factors have been included
to capture missing influences on individual asset returns.
The two-factormodel augments the CAPM by adding as
an additional explanatory variable the expected return on a
Two Models of Asset Pricing
As the discussion of the related literature shows, most
researchers have employed a particularempirical model of
capital assetprices in orderto focus on some aspectofbank
stock risk. Some debate persists among economists as to
the "correct" specification to use for describing equity
returns. In this paper, I investigate the behavior of bank
stocks in the context of two different models of asset
pricing: the single-index CAPM and a two-factor model.
The typical CAPM formulation is specified as follows:
where Rjt is the expected excess holding period return on
the equity ofbankjin period t, RMt is the expected excess
holding period return on the market portfolio ofstocks in
period t, 13Mj is a parameterto be estimatedthat represents
the sensitivity of the stock of bank j to changes in the
expected return on the market portfolio, cxj is another
estimated parameter that indicates deviations from equi-
librium pricing, and Ejt is the residual left unexplained by
the expected return on the market portfolio. 2
The parameter 13Mj is a measure of the covariance of
return on an individual stock with the return on the market
portfolioofrisky assets. Itthus represents the sensitivityof
(1)
20 Economic Review / Fall 1991debt security. The logic behind this model, as first pro-
posed by Stone (1974), is that investors have two general
categories ofassets to choose from: equity shares and debt
securities. As a result, expected returns on both types of
instruments should be relevant in setting the price of
individual financial assets. This same type of two-factor
model also can be derived more rigorously from Merton's
(1973) intertemporal version ofthe CAPM, or from Ross's
(1976) multi-factor arbitrage pricing theory. A number of
testsofthe two~factormodel using stock returns ofindus-
trial companies found little significance for debt returns.
However, stocks of companies in certain sectors, such as
utilities and financial intermediaries, typically exhibit sig-
nificant sensitivity to changes in returns ondebt securities.
The two-factor model takes the form
(2) R jt = (Xj + f3Mj R Mt + f3ljRlt + Ejt ,
where R ltis the expected excess holding period return on a
selected debt security in period t, f3lj is a parameter that
captures the sensitivity ofassetjtochangesinthe expected
holding period return on debt, and the other variables and
parameters are as defined in equation (1).4
Two modeling issues arise in empirical applications of
the asset pricing equations (1) and (2). First, time-series
regressions of these equations imply that the estimated
coefficients should be constant over time. Evidence sug-
gests, however, that estimated f3s exhibit considerable
temporal variation. Moreover, efforts to relate the estimat-
ed coefficients to balance sheet composition variables
suggest that these coefficients will change with changes in
the asset/liability mix ofbanks. Recent evidence by Kane
andUnal(1988) using a switchingregression methodology
andby Kwan (1991) in the contextofa randomcoefficients
framework confirms the nonstationarity ofthe debt return
f3 in equation (2). Other work in a CAPM framework
likewise suggeststhat f3Mj varies over time. Inorderto deal
with this issue, I estimate versions ofthe two assetpricing
equations over different subsamples of the 1979 to 1990
period. This procedure generates statistics that enable me
to test for the constancy ofthe estimated regression coef-
ficients. 5
The second modeling issue involves possible multi-
collinearity between the two returns series used as explan-
atory variables in equation (2). Chance and Lane (1980)
argue that returns on debt probably are influenced by the
same factors that determine the returns on the market
portfolio of stocks. One way to deal with this issue, they
suggest, is to orthogonalize one ofthe series by regressing
it on the other. The residual series from this regression,
which by definition is uncorrelated with the otherexplana-
tory variable, then can be used as a regressor in the equity
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returns estimatingequation. This procedure eliminates the
estimationbias andisolates stockmarketfrom extramarket
effects on stock returns. Ofcourse, the direction of caus-
ality in this first-stage regression is not clear. Chance and
Lane regress the debt return variable on the stock market
return while others, including Lynge and Zumwalt (1980)
and Flannery and James (1982), perform the opposite
regression.
This second issue may be important for hypothesis
testing..Giliberto (1985) shows thattheestimated standard
errors of the second-stage regression coefficients are un-
biased only for the series that was used as the dependent
variable in the first~stage regression. This means that
studies regressing the stock market index on the debt
returns variable, like Flannery and James (1982), may
producebiasedestimatesofthe significanceof I3lj ' butwill
yield unbiased estimates ofthe standard errors of I3Mj' To
determine the empirical significance ofthis bias, I reesti-
mated all of the equations presented in the next section
using both orthogonalizations. While the two series did
exhibit significant cross correlation, the orthogonalized
results did not differ in a statistically significant way from
those reported here.6 This suggests that any bias resulting
from the multicollinearity between the explanatory vari-
ables in the two-factor model is not substantial enough to
alter the empirical results.
The two asset pricing models described above predict
that different firms' equity returns will exhibit differing
sensitivities to stock market and debt returns. In terms of
the models' parameters, this meansthateach firm will have
its own specific values of (Xj' I3Mj and I3lj ' The estimation
results described in the next section are from pooled
regressions that combine time-series observations from all
the banks in the sample. In Section IV, I group the banks
into four size categories and describe regressions on these
subsets of banks. The estimated parameter values pre-
sented in Tables 2 and 3 are thus averages ofthe (xs and I3s
for different samples of banks. In this paper, I do not
present estimated parameters for individual banks. To
reflectthis "averaging" in the discussionbelow, Idropthej
subscripts from all (X and 13 parameters (referring to
individual banks) when describing the estimation results.
Data
Inthe currentstudy, Iestimatemonthly stockreturnsofa
sampleof84large bankholding companies taken from the
Compustat Bank tapes. The monthly returns are derived
from end-of-month stock prices, and are adjusted for
dividends and stock splits. The Compustat tapes include
data on bank holding companies whose stocks trade on a
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major exchange. This means that the sample includes
primarily large banks and is thus not completely repre-
sentative of all U.S. banks. Of the 84 bank holding
companies considered in the current study, the smallest
heldassets in the first quarterof1990 of$2.3billion, while
the largest had over $230 billionin assets. The sample was
chosen on the basis of availability over the entire interval
1979 to 1990. This period provides a number of observa-
tions prior to deregulation ofbank interest rates, and also
encompasses several cyclical episodes. With 144 time
points and 84 banks, the sample includes over 12,000 data
observations.
The return on the market portfolio is proxied by the
monthly return series on the equal-weighted Standard &
Poor's 500 index of stocks. This variable was taken from
the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) tape
for the period 1979 to 1988, and from DRI's U.S. Central
database for 1989 and 1990. The debt return series is
an approximation of the monthly holding period return
on 30-year constant maturity U.S. Government bonds.
The approximation, as suggested by Flannery and James
(1984b), is
(Yt - Yt - 1)
Yr- 1
where Yt is the investment yield in month t on the bond.
This expression is the percentage change in the bond's
yield, multiplied by - 1. Note that monthly bond returns
fall as yields rise. Thus, a positive estimatedcoefficient on
this variable implies that bank stock returns are negatively
affected by increases in bond yields. The yield series used
in the construction of this variable was obtained from
Citibase.
III. Bank Stock Risk and Return Over Time
A First Look
Indescribing changes in bankstockrisk, it is essential to
have an accepted measure ofthat risk. From the standpoint
ofportfolio theory, expected or ex ante risk is the relevant
factor that determines asset prices. Unfortunately, such
anticipated risk is generally unobservable. As a proxy, it is
common to look at realized, or ex post, risk as the
appropriate descriptor of asset risk, with the belief that
past volatility is a likely indicator of future volatility. 7
Economists typically consider the total variance of his-
torical asset returns (or its square root, the standard
deviation) as an appropriate measure of the overall vol-
atility associated with asset returns.
Table 1contains summary statistics ofmonthly holding
period returns for three different groups of assets for the
1979-1990 period, as well as for four subperiods ofthat in-
terval. In the first two columns, I present the period aver-
ages ofthe mean and standarddeviation ofmonthlyreturns
for the sample of 84 bank holding company stocks. The
second pair of columns contains comparable statistics for
the 30 Dow Jones Industrial firms. In both cases, the num-
bers presented in Table 1 are unweighted averages of the
22 Economic Review / Fall 1991individual company means and standarddeviations during
the applicable period.8 The last two columns in Table 1
contain the mean and standard deviation of the monthly
return on 30~year constant maturity Treasury bonds.
The first row ofTable 1contains statistics for the 12-year
period, 1979 to 1990. Overthis interval, the meanmonthly
return on both groups ofstocks significantly exceeded the
mean return on bonds. At the same time, the total risk
associated with holding either of these groups of stocks
was more than twice the risk of holding Treasury bonds.
Between the two samples ofstocks, the 30 industrial firms
provided a slightly higher mean monthly return and faced
somewhatlessaverage riskthanthe sampleofbankholding
company stocks, although the differences between the two
groups are small. Duringthefull 12-yearperiod, it does not
appear that bank stocks were significantly riskier than
other equities.
In the bottomportion ofTable 1, I divide the full sample
period into four subperiods and present the averages of
mean monthly returns andstandarddeviations for the three
groups ofassets during these different subperiods. The 30
industrial stocks show an upward trend in returns over the
four subperiods of the sample, while the bank stocks
exhibit a generally downward trend. Notably, in only the
1988-90 subperiod were bank stock returns below the
returns on both the 30 industrial stocks and the T-bonds.
Whilebankstockreturns declinedinthe latterhalfofthe
sample period, the variance ofthese stockreturnsrose over
the course of the 12-year sample period. The average
standard deviation ofreturn on the 84 bank holding com-
pany stocks was 20 percent higher in the last two sub-
periods than it was in the first part of the sample. The
average risk of the 30 industrial stocks rose through the
1985-87 period, but then declined in the 1988-90 period.
The standard deviation of bond returns fluctuated during
the four quarters ofthe sample withoutany apparent trend.
Again, itis notablethat, inthe lastsubperiodofthe sample,
the standard deviation ofbank stock returns exceeded the
standarddeviationsofthe othertwo groups ofassets. Thus,
by the end ofthe 1979-90 period, bank holding company
stocks were more volatile than the other assets and offered
investors a lower rate ofreturn.
The numbers presented in Table 1 provide support for
the perception that bank stocks have become riskier in
recent years. The volatility ofbankholding company stock
returns increased during the 1980s, both in absolute terms
and relative to other portfolios offinancial assets, includ-
ing otherequities. At the same time, the average returns to
holding bank stocks declined significantly. By the latter
halfofthe 1980s, it appears that investors in bankequities
suffered from both higher risk and lower returns.
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Risk in the Context of the 1\vo Asset-Pricing Models
The summary statistics ofTable 1confirm that the total
variability ofbankstock returns increased overthe 1979 to
1990 period. However, it is useful to determine if the
sensitivity of bank stocks to systematic sources of risk
changed during this period. Finance theory predicts that
(expected) asset returns should depend on systematic risk
andnot ontotal risk. Forexample, the CAPM suggests that
only risk associated with returns on the market portfolio
will be compensated by higher expected asset returns.
Similarly, the two-factor model predicts that market risk
and interest rate risk should be compensated by higher
returns. Thus, the higher risks and lower returns on bank
stocks observed in the bottom portionofTable 1could still
be consistent with equilibrium asset pricing models if
returns fell because systematic riskdeclined. Estimationof
equations (1) and (2) in the previous section can help to
shed light on this point.
Table 2 contains regression results from estimating the
CAPMand the two-factor model on time series of the
monthly stockreturns ofthe 84 bankholding companies in
the sample. The coefficients from these estimates cor-
respond to equations (1) and (2) discussed above. The
parameter estimates presented in Table 2 are average
values across the 84 bank holding companies in the sam-
ple. The top part ofTable 2 contains estimation results for
the full 12-year sample period, while the bottomportion of
the table contains estimates from the four subperiods. I test
the significance of the estimated coefficients against the
null hypotheses that a and 131 are zero and 13M is one.
The CAPM results for the whole sample show that the
average covariance ofbank holding company stocks rela-
tive to the S&P500index was less thanthe "average" stock
during the 1979-90 period, as indicated by the estimated
13M of 0.92, which is significantly less than one. This
suggests that, over the 12 years of the sample interval,
changes in the stock market as a whole were associated
with less than one-for-one changes in bankstocks. A long-
run value of 13M that is close to one is reasonable because
banks are expected to hold diversified portfolios of loans
and other assets whose returns should mimic the behavior
ofthe broadermarket. Whilethis may notbetrue for small,
regional banks, it certainly should apply to the relatively
large banks included in the current sample. The positive,
significant value ofa suggests that, on average, the sample
ofbank holding company stocks was underpriced during
the 12-year period, yielding returns in excess. of what
would be predicted by the basic CAPM. The model ex-
plains only about 25 percentofthe total variance ofreturns
during the sample period. This means that bank stock
returns contained a large portion of nonsystematic risk.
23In the two-factor model for the 12-year sample period,
both factors were highly significant in explaining bank
stock returns from 1979 to 1990. This confirms previous
evidenceregardingthe sensitivity ofbankequity returns to
changes in bond yields over and above their sensitivity to
the stock market. Moreover, the estimated coefficient, 13/,
is positive, indicating that bank stock returns were nega-
tively affected by increases in long-term yields during the
sample period. Adding the debt returns variable to the
estimating equation reduces somewhat the stock market
sensitivity of bank equities. While the change in this
coefficient suggests that the two factors may be collinear,
the results were the same when the explanatory variables
were purged oftheir common influence. As in the CAPM
formulation, the positive and significant value of ex sug-
gests that bank stocks were, on average, underpriced dur-
ing the 12-yearperiod. The expanded model explains about
27 percent of the variance of bank stock returns, only
slightly better than the CAPM, and again indicating sub-
stantial nonsystematic risk.
Several striking results stand out from the estimates of
the two models for the subperiods. First, in the context of
24 Economic Review / Fall 1991the CAPM, market-related systematic risk ofbank equity
returns, as embodied in 13M' increased during the four
subperiods ofthe 12-year interval. The estimated value of
13M rose from 0.72 in the 1979-81 period to 1.30 during
1988-90.9 Investors who held bank equities faced more
market-related risk over the period and were rewarded for
assuming this additional systematic risk by receiving a
higher return.
The increase in market-relatedriskis even more striking
when viewed in the context of the two-factor model.
Estimated values of 13M more than doubled from the
beginning to the end of the sample period, from 0.60 in
1979-81 to 1.26in 1988-90.10These estimates confirm that
the systematic, market-related risk ofbank holding com-
pany stocks increaseddramatically during the 1979 to 1990
period.
Perhaps the most striking result in the quarter-sample
estimates is the progression of the estimated coefficients
on debtreturns. The values of 131 decrease monotonically
over the four subperiods of the sample, from above 0.50
during both the 1979-81 and 1982-84periods, to 0.26from
1985 to 1987, to insignificantly different from zero during
the 1988-90 sample period. In contrast to stock market-
related risk, the sensitivity ofbank equity returns to bond
yields declined during the past decade. Moreover, bank
holding company stock returns showed no sensitivity to
changes in yields in the last three-year period of the
sample, the only subinterval for which this was true. While
bank stocks faced greater volatility with respect to the
stock market, they clearly became increasingly insulated
fromthe effects ofbond yield changes.
Ofcourse, systematic bank stock risk is only one aspect
oftotal risk. The remaining portion of risk represents
residual, or nonsystematic, bank equity risk. This, too,
changed significantly during the 1980s. The two-factor
model, for example, explains between25 and40percentof
total bankstockreturns during the first three subperiods of
the12-yearsample interval. By the 1988-90 period, this
model explains less than 20 percentoftotal returns. Thus,
the model leaves a large componentofbankequity returns
unexplained. Clearly, bank stocks entail a substantial
amount ofasset-specific risk that is not accounted for by
the systematic risk factors of these asset pricing models.
Finally, while bank stocks apparently were underpriced
on average during the 12-year period, as indicated by the
positive values of<X inthe first two rows ofTable 2, market
pricing of bank stocks changed during the course of the
1980s. Estimated intercepts were significantly positive
during the first two quarters of the sample period, were
statistically indistinguishable from zero in the 1985-87
period, and then turned significantly negative in the last
part of the sample interval. In terms of the asset pricing
models estimated in Table 2, this means that the stocks of
the 84 bank holding companies were overpriced in the
1988-90 period, yielding a lower return than the models
would predict.
IV. Some Cross-Sectional Comparisons
While the estimates presented in Table 2contain impor- company may reflect its enhanced opportunities for asset
tant information about bankequity risks during the past 12 diversification. Such a large bank thus may exhibit less
years, they also conceal substantial cross-sectional varia- variability relative to the broader market than a smaller
tion in bank stocks' responses to stock market and interest bank whose opportunities for diversification may be more
rate risk. Forexample, I estimatedvalues of 13M} and 131}for limited. Similarly, a large bank may be able to exploit
each ofthe 84 bank holding companies during the various possibleeconomiesofscale inhedging againstinterestrate
subintervals of the sample period. I then generated sum- risk that a small bank cannot. These differences will show
mary statistics on these "samples" of coefficient esti- up in the asset pricing models in terms ofdifferent values
mates. The variance of these coefficients was by far the of 131'. Moreover, ifregulators implement, eitherexplicitly
greatest in the 1988-90 period. That is, there was consider- orimplicitly, apolicy ofprotecting largebanksfrom failure
ably more variation across bank stocks in their stock while permitting smaller institutions to go under, such a
market and bond yield sensitivity during the last three policy may be reflected in estimates of the asset pricing
years ofthe 12-year sample periodthan in any otherpartof models and probably will differ across institutions.
the interval. This suggests that banks may have responded To address this question, I split the sample of 84 bank
in different ways to changes in their economic and regula- holding companies into four size categories according to
tory environment. dollaramountofassets as ofthe first quarterof1987. Ithen
One way to separate banks in the sample is by size. Itis estimated separate regressions for each category.11 The
reasonable to assume that the stocks of different-sized estimates follow a distinct pattern where size clearly is
banks may face differing sensitivities to systematic risk relevant to the banks' stock sensitivities to the two risk
factors. For example, the stock of a large bank holding factors. To highlight the differences between the various
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 25groups, I present in the four panels of Table 3 the sub-
sample results from the two-factor model fOr four sizes of
banks: assets less than $5 billion (13 banks), assets be~
tween $5 and $20 billion (37 banks), assets between $20
and $55 billion (24 banks), and assets greater than $55
billion (10 banks). As in Table 2, significance levels test
against a value of 13M equal to one and values ofa and 131
equal to zero.
The results in Table 3 suggest that the greatest dif-
ferences inestimatedparameters arebetweenthe stocks of
thesmallestbanksin the sampleand those ofthe remaining
banks; the three larger categories of banks show quite
similarestimationresults. Forexample, the three groups of
larger banks all exhibited generally increasing values of
13M over the course of the four subperiods. In contrast,
there is no cleartrend to the estimated values of13Mfor the
smallestbanks in the sample. Thus, the stocksofthe larger
banks all became more sensitive to stock market-related
risk during the 1980s, while the smaller bank stocks
showed no tendency to entail higher market risk. It is
notable that the smallerbank stocks had the highest market
risk in the first portion of the sample period, 0.8 versus
values of 13M between 0.4 and 0.6 for the other three
categories of banks. By the end of the sample period,
however, the smallestbanks had by far thelowestestimated
values of 13M' 0.7. The other groups of banks all had
estimates of 13M in the last period that exceeded one
(although only the largest two groups had parameter esti-
mates that were significantly different from one). More-
over, the stocks ofthe largest group ofbanks exhibited the
greatest sensitivity to stock market risk ofany banks in the
sample. The estimated parameter value of 1.8 in the last
period ofthe sample is largerthan any otherpointestimate
in this study.
Bank stock sensitivity to bond yields also showed an
interesting pattern. Again, the stocks ofthe smallestgroup
of bank holding companies stand out from the others,
while the other three groups of bank stocks look very
similar. The stock returns of the three groups of larger
banks all exhibited significant sensitivity to bond yields in
the first subperiod ofthe sample, with estimated values of
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131 near 0.6. In contrast, the group ofsmaller bank stocks
showed little sensitivity to yield changes, as indicated by
the coefficient estimate of0.2. As the 1980s progressed,
t1le~ellsitivityofthe. stock returns for the three categories
oflarger.banks alLdeclined until, in the final three-year
period. of the sample, none of the banks' equity returns
showed any evidence ofsignificant interest rate risk. The
stocks of the smallest banks in the sample continued to
exhibitlittleorno interestrateriskin thefoursubperiods of
thesarilple.Whilethepointestimates remain aboutthe
same (0.2), the estimated standard errors increase over
time such that the coefficient on the debt return variable is
statistically insignificant in the last portion ofthe sample.
TheR2 statistics from these regressions indicatethatthe
estimates for each size group leave a large portion ofbank
stock returns unexplained. Thus, stocks of the different-
sized banks in the sample all have a significant component
ofnOnsystematic risk. Moreover, the R2 for all four groups
declines in the last part ofthe sample interval, indicating
that the proportion ofbank stockreturns attributable to the
two systematic riskfactors fell in the 1988-90period. This
is particularly true for the smallest banks in the sample.
While the two-factor model explained about 20 percent of
stock returns for the other three size groups from 1988 to
1990, itprovidedless than 10 percentofthe explanationfor
the smallest group of banks. It is not ~urprising that the
stocks of the smaller banks in the sample exhibited the
most nonsystematic risk since these smaller banks may be
more heavily influenced by bank-specific events and local
market conditions. Nevertheless, all banks in the sample,
including the largest ones, exhibited significant nonsys-
tematic equity risk.
Finally, the estimatedvalues ofa follow the samepattern
as for.the entire sample, and are roughly similarfor all size
categoriesofbanks. as arepositiveinallfour casesearly in
the 12-year sample period, and all tum negative in the last
subperiod. As mentioned above, this means that bank
stocks provided abnormally high returns (relative to. the
predictions ofthe theoretical asset pricing models) in the
late1970s and early 1980s, and abnormally low returns in
the late 1980s.
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The results presented above highlight a number of
interesting aspects of the behavior of bank holding com-
pany stock returns from 1979 to 1990. For example, the
total variabilityofbankequity returns increasedduring the
sample period relative to the returns on industrial equities
and on bonds. Moreover, this increased total volatility of
returns occurred at the same time that the level ofaverage
bank equity returns fell relative to the other assets. By the
end of the 1980s, holders of bank stocks faced relatively
higher risk and relatively lower returns.
In the context of the asset pricing models estimated in
this paper, changes in the total risk and return of bank
equities were accompanied by a significant shift in the
sensitivity of bank stocks to systematic risk factors. The
covariance between bank equity returns and a broad stock
market index definitely rose on average during the 1980s.
In the latter part of the 1980s, average values of stock
market betas for the 84 bank holding companies in the
sampleexceeded one. Thus, changes in returns on the S&P
500 stock index were associated with a greater than one-
for-one movementinbankstockreturns, whereasthey were
less than one-far-one in the early 1980s. This increased
stockmarket sensitivity was especially pronounced for the
largerbanks in the sample. Thus, the stockreturns oflarge
bank holding companies became increasingly sensitive to
factors that influence the overall stock market.
One of the most striking findings in this paper is the
decline in the bond yield sensitivity ofbank stock returns
during the estimation period. By the last three-year period
inthe sample, banks stocks showed no statistically signifi-
cantevidenceofany effects ofbond yields on theirreturns.
Moreover, this finding was consistent across banks of all
sizes in the sample. The recent lack of bond yield sen-
sitivity contrasts sharply with the behavior of the same
bank stocks in the earlierpart ofthe sample period as well
as with the findings of previous studies. It is possible to
interpret this reduction in interest rate risk as the result of
bank managers making greater use of adjustable rate
instruments and other hedging strategies to insulate their
stock returns from the effects of changes in yields. It is
reasonable to conclude that interest rate deregulation and
financial market innovations, such as interest rate swaps,
financial futures contracts, and adjustable rate mortgages,
helped to reduce the interest rate risk of bank stocks by
widening the sphere for banks to engage in risk hedging
activities.
Ofcourse, there may be alternative explanations for the
apparent lack ofinterest rate risk in bank stock returns in
the last partofthe 1980s. Shifts in the observed sensitivity
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of bank equities can reflect changes not only in bank
behavior but also in the regulatory environment in which
banksoperate. Forexample, in the late 1980s, bankregula-
tors.from around the world were negotiating the structure
of international risk-based capital standards under the
aegis of the Bank of International Settlements. By 1987,
the likely future shape of these standards was becoming
cl~ar.. Under the new standards, risk adjustments to regu-
lated capital levels would be made on the basis of credit
risk only and would downplay interest rate risk. While
banks might be expected to respond to this change in
regulation by increasing their interest rate risk exposure,
the change in the enforcement policies ofregulators could
attenuate the impactofsuch actions onbankequity values.
The net result could be a reduction in the interest rate risk
embedded in bank stock returns.
Alternatively, the observed reduction in the debt return
sensitivity ofbankstocks mightbepartially explainedby a
statistical phenomenon. Ifthe variance ofdebt returns fell
significantly from 1988 to 1990 while bank stock returns
behaved similarly to earlier subperiods, this might explain
the lack ofsignificancefor the coefficientondebtreturns in
the last partofthe sample. In fact, the variance ofthe debt
returns seriesdidfall somewhatin the lastthree years ofthe
sample relative toearlier subperiods. However, this drop in
variance probably was not large enoughbyitselfto account
for the dramatic decline in the estimated 131 values from
1988 to 1990. More likely it is a combination of factors
related to changes in bank behavior, regulatory shifts, and
statistical effects that contributed to reduce the measured
sensitivity ofbank stock returns to changes in bond yields
in the last part ofthe sample period.
Finally, the results presented above support the con-
clusion that the proportion of nonsystematic risk in bank
stocks rose during the 12-year sample period. The asset
pricing models explain at most 40 to 50 percent of stock
returnvariabilityfor certainsizecategoriesofbanksduring
certain subsamples of the estimation period. The propor-
tion of total variance explained by the systematic risk
factors declined for the total and for each size group of
banks in the last three-year period of the sample. This
means that, in the late 1980s, bank stock risk was more
related to bank-specific factors than at any other time since
the late 1970s. The increase in nonsystematic risk was
greatest for the smaller banks in the sample. An accurate
assessment of the stock risk of these banks thus requires
less consideration of systematic risk factors and more
careful attention to factors specific to the individual
institutions.
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1. The two-index model, though proposed by Stone
(1974) in a somewhat adhoc fashion, also can bederived
formally from the intertemporal CAPM of Merton (1973), as
well as from the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) of Ross
(1976). The latter framework suggests thatthere may be
additional factors besides the two considered in these
studies that are relevant to explaining asset returns. For
example, Chen, Roll and Ross (1986) derive an APT model
in which five prespecified macroeconomic factors are
used to explain returns on several·· portfolios of·stock.
These authors find that several ofthe factors are important
in explaining the returns on diversified stock portfolios.
Campbell, Dietrich and Weinstein (1985) test the sig-
nificance of these five factors on portfolios of financial
intermediary stocks. They find thatbanks stocks are par-
ticularly sensitive to measures of default risk and term
structure premia (both related to interest rates) as well as
to the stock market index. These findings provide some
support for the two-index formulation used so extensively
in the banking literature.
2. The two holding period return series are expressed in
the CAPM in terms oftheir return in excess ofthe return on
a risk-free security, usually assumed to be a short-term
riskless government bond. If no asset is considered risk-
free, then it may be possible to construct an asset whose
rate of return has zero covariance withthe marketportfolio.
In this "zero-beta" version of the CAPM, the return on this
securityis considered to bethe risk-free rate ofreturn. See
Fama (1976) for discussion of this point.
3. If changes in the stock market, and thus the return on
the market portfolio, mirror movements in the macroecon-
omy, then the stockmarketbetacan also beinterpreted as
measuring the sensitivity of the asset's return to changes
in general economic conditions.
4. Again, all holding period returns are expressed in
excess of the risk-free rate of return, where that rate is the
yield on a short-term Treasury bill.
5. There are, of course, alternative ways to test for time-
varying effects on the estimated coefficients. For example,
a time trend could be included as an explanatory variable
in the regressions, although this would constrain time
effects to be linear and monotonic over the estimation
interval. Alternatively, it is possible to estimate a shift
parameter by interacting dummy variables for different
time periods with the explanatory variables in the re-
gression. Beebe (1985) uses this methodology. Another
method is to assume that the estimated coefficients de-
pend on some time-varying factor. Embedding this as-
sumption into the regression equations translates into
Federal ReserveBank ofSanFrancisco
inclUding additional, interacted explanatory variables in
the estimates. See Kwan (1991) for an examplebfthis
latterapproach. The methodology adopted here provides
considerable flexibility without imposing additional theo-
retical orempirical constraints, and generates easily inter-
preted test statistics.
6. The correlation coefficient between stock market and
debt returns was 0.28 during the 12-year sample period
andwas significantly different from zero.
7. Some modeling approaches permit the use of more
directproxies for ex ante risk. For example, Levonian,in an
article in this issue of the Economic Review, calculates
valuesofexante riskofbankstocksthatare implied bythe
prices ofoption contracts on those stocks.
8. I also considered weighting the individual stockreturns
by the assets of the firms included in the groupings. This
weighting did not significantly alter the results presented
in Table 1.
9. I conducted Chow tests of the constancy of the set of
estimated regression coefficients in the various subinter-
vals ofthe sample period. For the two halves ofthe 12-year
period, the F-value was 1.24. The critical value for the
F-distribution, at a 99 percent confidence level and with
(500, 1000) degrees of freedom, is 1.19. My half-sample
test had approximately 6000 degrees of freedom in both
numerator and denominator. Thus, the set of estimated
coefficients in the two half-intervals were significantly dif-
ferent from one another. On the quarter-interval estimates,
it was not possible to distinguish the first two quarters of
the sample period: the F-value was 1.12, with approx-
imately (3000, 3000) degrees of freedom. The third and
fourth quarters of the sample were significantly different
from one another: the F-value for this test was 1.46.
10. Chow tests on the constancy of the set of estimated
coefficients in the two-factor model confirm that these
coefficients changed significantly during the sample. The
F-value between the two half-intervals was 1.36; between
the first two quarters of the sample, 1.23; and between the
lasttwo quarters, 1.48. The critical value ofthe F-statistic at
the 99 percent level, with (500,1000) degrees of freedom,
is 1.19.
11. As mentioned in footnote 5, there are alternative ways
to estimate cross-sectional differences in risk sensitivity.
For example, size measures could be included as addi-
tional explanatory variables in the regression equations,
or as variables interacted with the two risk factors. The
method used here was chosen to highlight differences
between banks in the different size categories.
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